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Abstract: There is still a high degree of expectation that argumentation should be understood from the perspective
of the logical mode of reasoning with little attention to intuitions, emotions and physicality. Our proposal intends to
develop a comprehensive understanding of argumentation from the perspective of Michael Gilbert’s Theory of
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1. Introduction. It has been now a long time since we decided to introduce changes to the way
we had been teaching a critical thinking course called Modes of Reasoning. That happened when
we read Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics (1984) by
social and political theorists Ernersto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe. That book helped us to
understand that power relations existed in many areas of the social processes: social classes,
gender relations, racial and ethnic relations, sexual orientation and preferences, body abilities,
and several others. In each category, we included the dominant groups and the subdued ones:
⇒ Men over
o women
⇒ Whites over
o non-whites
⇒ Heterosexuals over
o people of different sexual orientations or preferences
⇒ Able body people over
o people whose bodies have a physical condition
⇒ Human beings over
o the rest of nature
In all these cases, the main issue is the dominant position of the upper layers over the subdued
ones: they have power over the others, resulting in imbalances of status in each category.
We added a category at the end that referred to modes of reasoning: Logic is dominant
over intuition, emotion and the physical in the case of human capacities. Thus, the teaching of
Modes of Reasoning courses entailed to discuss the logical mode in detail and systematically and
show whenever it was the case the problems of the subdued modes of experience. Thus, for
example in the case of emotions, show that they are likely going to take us to fallacies.
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We called all of the above: “structures of domination.”
Very significant advances have taken place in all the structures mentioned except for the
one in modes of reasoning.
Therefore, the main purpose of this paper is to show that we need to confront the fact that
all modes of reasoning need to be studied, evaluated and assessed in a way that is fair to their
specific nature.
For this purpose, we start from Michael Gilbert’s theory of Multi-Modal Argumentation.
However, before we introduce this theory it seems appropriate, given the title of this paper, to
refer to an analysis that argumentation theorist Catherine Hundleby (2011, p. 61) undertakes of
what she evaluates as “androcentrism as a fallacy of argumentation.” She claims that this fallacy:
holds significantly for ethnocentrism and other forms of ‘centrism’. Centrism is treating
members of a privileged group of people as standard or ideal; it takes the forms of
racism, hetero-sexism, and ableism, as well as other types of discrimination.
In Hundleby’s rich elaboration, the main point is that androcentrism is a fallacy in so far
as it treats men as the standard or ideal and thus it becomes another type of discrimination.
In introducing Michael Gilbert’s theory of Multi-Modal Argumentation, it is interesting
to mention that shortly before he does so in his book Coalescent Argumentation (1997, p. 2), he
discusses the topic of the relation between feminism and argumentation. A quote from this book
summarizes the problem.
[W]hen an approach is official, when it is presented as the only way to proceed, or as the
correct way to proceed, when the bureaucratic establishment in government, business,
and academe will brook no deviation, then its power is too great. People are not heard
and their communications dismissed because they do not ‘make sense’ according to the
Critical-Logic mode. They are set aside because they are emotional, fallacious, mystical,
based on feelings, argued incoherently or illogically. In this sense, it is not women who
are illogical, but logic that is illogical, because it is illogical to expect every person and
every community to fit into a specific pattern, be it formal or informal, in order for it to
be acceptable.
Michael Gilbert introduces his theory of Multi-Modal argumentation in Chapter 6 of his
book mentioned above. Because of its significance for this paper, the introduction is quoted in
full:
It has been argued in previous chapters that the traditional and dominant mode of
arguing, the C-L, Critical-Logical mode, is restrictively narrow. When this mode is seen
as the only one legitimate form of rational argumentation, then there are profound and
unreasonable limitations on actual argumentation as performed by real actors, and the
limitation of methods favored by one group over another. These limitations provide both
descriptive and normative reasons for rejecting the C-L mode as the sole legitimate form
of argumentation. In this chapter, three new modes of argumentation, raising the number
to four, are introduced. In addition to the classical logical mode (usually and egregiously
identified with “the rational”), there are the emotional, visceral (physical) and kisceral
(intuitive) modes. This chapter introduces these modes (p. 75).
Dealing with imbalances of power in the structures of domination mentioned at the
beginning does not mean that the power relations need to be turned around such that women
should now become dominant over men, that non-white racial and ethnic groups should now
2

have power over white people, that people of other sexualities and preferences should now have
power over heterosexuals, etc. In the case of modes of reasoning, that intuitive people, emotional
people and physical people should have power over logical people. The crucial task is to
ascertain the relations between them in a way that can be fair. Thus, sometimes the mode
stressed should be the intuitive, other times the emotional and still other times the physical or the
logical mode.
When people argue (argument 1 or argument 2, although we are concerned in our
research mainly with argument2), we need to be aware of the mode that is at stake: it could be the
logical mode of course such as in the case of a mathematical theorem, but it could be the
emotional mode such as in the case of a sentimental relation, or the intuitive mode in cases for
example of assessing the best course of action when we have no experiential basis to judge, or
the physical mode when the issue is for example a case of tasting.
The concern, given our educational system, is that the logical mode tends to be
overvalued in all cases of argumentation. Indeed, if we are dealing with a mathematical theorem
or a logical deduction, the logical mode is paramount. Although, the intuitive mode plays a part
here since the principles of logic seem to be intuitively ascertained.
2. Reflections on Gilbert’s four modes of argumentation
We proceed now by examining each mode in detail beginning with the logical mode.
2.1 The logical mode has a history of approximately 2,500 years. We could perhaps say that it
appeared together with writing in either the 9th or 8th century B.C. For the development of
philosophy, the logical mode was crucial. It was Aristotle who gave it the pre-eminence as a
respectable structure that became a cornerstone of Western Civilization.
In his book Coalescent Argumentation, Michael Gilbert (1997) prefers to call it logical
mode instead of rational mode arguing that the term rational leads to a more general discussion
than what is necessary given the topic of his theory of Multi-Modal Argumentation. Indeed,
Gilbert believes that his theory relates closely to natural language.
The logical mode of argumentation has been very relevant in history. Among other
contributions, it has allowed the development of science and technology, the development of
discussion, deliberation, of finding agreements and disagreements through the use of logical
argumentation.
Gilbert acknowledges that universities guide themselves by this traditional mode.
However, he claims that, at the same time, the term “rational” which tends to be identified with
logical has become too narrow and restrictive.
Multi-Modal Argumentation theory as proposed by Gilbert opens up to the world of
everyday life by searching natural language. In that way, he manages to identify other ways of
arguing besides the logical mode. He maintains that through conversations in everyday life,
people argue in the four modes that his theory proposes.
Consequently, it seems very difficult to find the logical mode in a state so to speak “pure”
in daily life or even in academic endeavors. Given this fact, it is possible to claim that a
definition of the logical mode becomes a complex task, although we can count on many
academic papers that provide logical definitions. The point here is that these papers are
fundamentally academic, developed with great effort in universities to communicate what we
believe is relevant for the development of human knowledge.
3

In this paper, we follow Michael Gilbert’s approach in order to study argumentation from
the perspective of how it appears in daily life. Now, the task is to define the logical mode from
that vantage point.
Michael Gilbert says that the term “logical” is used in order to isolate a sense of the
“rational” that can be correlated with reasoned linearity that ideally happens in dialectical
argumentation. He highlights the linearity of logic according to which arguments are presented in
a sequential way, that is, propositions follow from others in a dialectical argumentation.
However, the process as it happens in reality is not exactly linear. In this sense it is appropriate to
refer to contemporary philosopher Byung-Chul-Han (2019), who claims that with the
development of globalization culture has been losing that linearity in so far as it is insufficient to
explain the high degree of violent social and political upheaval. In this sense, the logical mode
does not seem to be sufficient to explain many things that happen in our contemporary world.
Gilbert also maintains that an argument is evaluated as logical if it takes its information,
that is, its support and evidence, from traditional rationalistic sources and besides, if it can be put
in a traditional rational form.
Broadly, we could characterize the logical mode as the attempt to present ideas to other
people in the form of arguments where those ideas could be validated. Therefore, how should we
understand validity? We could do so if we do it in the shape of premises that would validate
conclusions. In any case, we appeal directly to the logical capacity of interlocutors. We do not
appeal to their emotions or their intuitions or to their physicality. Rather we treat the interlocutor
as of equal reasoning capacity, someone with whom we can establish a relation of logical
equality.
According to some authors, logic, argumentation, and critical thinking are disciplines
open to accept their limits and able to question and confront their very nature. As we can see, this
way of conceiving logic includes self-analysis as one of its distinctive characteristics, and
moreover it legitimates the question for its definition and even its relevance. We can therefore
say that logic, understood as an open discipline, allows to permanently update its limits and
delineate its sense and meaning.
However, we believe that, so far, we still need more elaboration in order to understand
what is meant by logical argumentation. In this way we can be prepared for a better
understanding of what Michael Gilbert calls the logical mode. Perhaps, a few comparisons may
help us to advance in the understanding of this concept.
It is important that we point out at this stage that research in psychology has recently
discovered empirically that the physical or visceral mode is connected to the logical mode. In
particular, psychologists refer that when we speak, simultaneously we move our hands. Such
movement according to them is not just a meaningless gesture. We will examine this view in the
section of the paper that refers to the physical mode.
We should perhaps digress at this point in order to show an example of the way nonverbal language has been viewed as no more than simply appearing together with verbal
language. For example, J. L. Austin (2003), in the sixth lecture of one of his best-known works,
How to Do Things with Words, mentions that non-verbal language, that is to say certain gestures
that would provide some strength to the verbal expressions, are simply elements that accompany
them.
As we know, this posthumous work by Austin is a collection of the lectures he gave over
several months at Harvard University in 1955. These lectures became the culmination of his
theory of speech acts. Therefore, the sequence of these lectures, show the advances that Austin
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made throughout that year. Now, in spite of what he said in the sixth lecture, in the ninth one he
changed his view by assigning for the first time a legitimate and proper space to non-verbal
language: here Austin mentioned that illocutionary acts may also be developed by non-verbal
acts. He remarks, however, that these non-verbal acts must be necessarily conventional in the
same way as verbal acts. Thus, at this point, Austin does not characterize non-verbal acts as
simply appearing together with verbal acts.
In a different way, psychologists, as mentioned above, today have verified that the
movement of the hands is a thought which allows oral speech to be articulated. That is to say that
hand gesture contributes inherently to the development of thoughts.
This development in psychology may be interpreted as a way to validate even further
Gilbert’s theory of Multi-Modal Argumentation.
Since we have worked for many decades in universities, Multi-Modal Argumentation
theory has helped us to deliver our teaching, in the area of critical thinking and other areas, with
a ‘high doses of reality.’ Given that the logical mode is central in universities, we tell students
half joking that the university is the ‘cathedral of logic’ so that the introduction of Gilbert’s
theory allows students to be aware of other ways of experiencing arguments. It becomes a sort of
opening to a different way of interacting with people with other ways of arguing, thus allowing
students to be aware of the way we all argue. We believe that this is a necessary attitude to
improve communication in social groups that are increasingly more heterogeneous and
interdisciplinary.
For that reason alone, we must acknowledge that we consider Michael Gilbert’s theory as
ground-breaking. For academics who work with ideas, concepts, categories, and theories, we
believe that logical argumentation is vital for the development of the analysis of all sorts of
topics. At the same time, that logical praxis itself shows that frequently we find areas that are not
commensurable with the realities that we are dealing with from the logical perspective. We may
even discover that the logical mode is not sufficient to understand the issues that we are dealing
with. When that happens, we may seek help from literature, poetry, the fine arts and the
humanities. In that way, we may find for instance intuitions that allow us to continue working in
the logical endeavour. Or in more extreme cases, we just stay at the level of intuitions!
2.2 We examine now the emotional mode of argumentation
First, we need to introduce the way in which emotion is understood in our research and in this
paper. For this purpose, we agree with the approach taken in the book Emotion in Discourse
edited by J. Lachlan Mackenzie and Laura Alba-Juez (2017): In our research and in this book, as
its title makes evident, we have chosen the term emotion, and within emotion we include,
indistinctly, feelings, moods and all kinds of affective experience (p. 15). We think that a
definition like this one is necessary and sufficient for our main purpose at this stage of our
research.
This mode represented for us a challenge in our teaching of courses in Modes of
Reasoning, especially when we had to deal with informal fallacies and in particular with the
fallacies that some authors label as emotional fallacies. From the perspective of Multi-Modal
Argumentation, the emotional fallacies may be seen in a different light. It was for us surprising
to realize that many of them were not necessarily fallacious. Moreover, they could be evaluated
as a legitimate way of arguing especially in the context of everyday life. The experience of
teaching the course in this new light took us to reflect deeply on this paradoxical issue. Students
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tended to agree with us that we ought to be careful when assessing emotional fallacies. We
realized that one core problem is that emotions have tended to be seen in a rather negative light
in western civilization, especially as contrasted with logic which has been assumed as the
paradigm of good reasoning in that tradition.
This approach to the study of fallacies precipitated in our courses of Modes of Reasoning
a fruitful debate. However, the exchanges with students and among ourselves was longstanding
and difficult until we realized that Gilbert’s theory could provide an answer to our queries. The
answer can be summarized by reference to the notion of “context.”
Given that arguments in general happen beyond the academy and relate intimately to the
language used in daily life, it is important to concentrate on the illocutionary force that the
context provides to discourses. This awareness took us to realize that in many cases of
argumentative exchanges the emotional mode was a legitimate one. This can happen when
emotions appear as central in exchanges in which the issues involved relate rather to private life
such as the relations between members of a family, or the relations between friends or lovers, in
general, relations that can be defined by intimacy or trust. The question is whether such cases
could be properly investigated in the context of the academy if only the logical mode is accepted.
This suggests that the approach provided by Gilbert’s theory could be useful in dealing with
intimate relations or those that involve trust.
It seems easy to judge arguments in which emotions appear as ipso facto fallacious, so
the concept of context may provide a way in which emotional expressions could be examined
more fairly in the academy. Now, of course it is possible that some emotions can lead to
fallacies, however that should be evaluated with fairness. Furthermore, we should also be
prepared to examine arguments that are ‘logically fallacious’ which can happen for example if
there is an exaggerated stress on logic in their analysis.
Since context is being considered now in the approach that we take to emotions, actually
a very interesting and challenging way of dealing with them relates to the following: what
happens when we examine what we do when we teach as compared with what happens when we
have exchanges with students outside the strictly lecturing or tutorial situation. During the class
(lecturing or tutorial), it is expected that teachers will try their best to keep their emotions under
control. For example, if teachers become angry with some students, they may try to keep that
emotion under control and deal with the situation in a calm and restrained way. More interesting
is the inevitable state of mind that many teachers have when lecturing: many teachers in our
experience have difficulty in controlling their excitement when dealing with a subject for which
they have a very positive feeling. Furthermore, many students seem to like that excitement.
Indeed, as well as with other matters pertaining to pedagogy research would be needed.
Now, what happens when a class is over, and a student approaches us and begins to tell
us about the reason why she could not attend the exam the week before. She had a personal
problem and wonders as to whether she could still have another chance. Probably in such case
there is a combination of emotional and logical arguments. And what do we as teachers do in
such case? Perhaps a combination of emotions and logical analysis as well. We are still in the
university but beyond the classroom, so other factors come to play. Our relation with the student
is just institutional, we may hardly know the name of the student, and, in fact, we know almost
nothing about the student. But the student wants badly to have a chance to write the exam, so the
emotions are running very high. The issue for the teacher is still institutional and may feel
emotions as well, but a sense of fairness is central to the job.
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In the case of medical professionals, emotions will develop in their relations with patients
as well: and they perhaps will recognize the need to allow emotional reactions on the part of the
patients and even in their own selves. And so is the case when a very tough social and or political
situation develops. People are expected to react emotionally.
Therefore, we must be able to recognize that emotional arguments do exist in every
aspect of our lives and we cannot just assume that either they should be controlled and be
considered fallacious or worse, repressed. Rather, the role of the argumentation theorist is to be
able to investigate emotional arguments without assuming that by nature they are fallacious. Of
course, some emotional arguments may be fallacious, but clearly not inherently.
In our pedagogical experience, we have come to realize that teaching involves emotional
argumentation as well as physical and kisceral argumentation. It is true that in our fields, logical
argumentation tends to predominate and of course we must be respectful of this fact. At the same
time, we must be aware of the input of the other modes of argumentation. We tell our students
that when we enter into the classroom, it is not only our heads floating in the air one or more
meters from the floor. True, it must be made clear that we are there to understand and develop
knowledge at the same time that we must be clear that we think with the mind that is related to
the brain, and ultimately that we are a multi-dimensional unit of body, mind, emotions and
subjectivity.
Our intention is that in a course on argumentation and critical thinking, students could be
in a position of overcoming the positivist limits according to which critical thinking is just an
intellectual competence.
Also, it is worth mentioning that, for example, when a student becomes uncomfortable
and begins to close the laptop and put away the pencils and books, it may be a visceral sign that
the class is about to be over in spite of our emotional involvement with the lecture. Or if a
student gestures with the hand, another visceral sign, indicating a disagreement with our view,
we should be prepared to stop and ask the student to express the disagreement. This one may be
an emotional disagreement and then we should be able to discuss as openly as possible the matter
with that student and possibly with all of them.
In summary, we are now in a position to quote one of Gilbert’s main characterizations of
emotional arguments as compared with logical arguments:
Logical arguments are based on an appeal to the linear patterns that lead us from one
statement or set of statements to a claim. These arguments are linguistic, dialectical and
classically identified with serial predications. Emotional arguments demonstrate how we
feel about certain claims or aspects of the argumentation procedure, and communicate
emotional reactions through a variety of means to a disputed partner. In addition,
emotions are sometimes used as warrant or data for claims. (p.84)
In developing theories, we foremost rely on our analytical capacity. In the process of
analyzing, we tend to separate what in reality appears unified. Perhaps, it happens that since the
beginning of the educational system, we are taught that we are rational beings who must always
try to argue in a logical way, therefore neglecting the role that emotions may play in our
education.
We inherited from Ancient Greek philosophers, as well as medieval and later in particular
modern philosophers, a certain reverent fear of expressing emotions. According to Plato, the
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development of the lower parts of the soul was characteristic of the class of producers who were
ignorant of true knowledge. True knowledge, which only can be achieved by philosophers,
is eminently rational and logical. Rational knowledge must be grounded in reason and it may be
still conceived as emancipatory. As Kant (2000) said in the eighteen century, rational knowledge
allows us to come out of childhood.
In that way, western civilization divided us from the inside into irreconcilable parts:
emotion corresponds to the animal side and reason to the human side. However, in fact we are
emotional animals as well, whatever the level of our logical potential. This allows us to
understand emotions as active, real and profound components of human beings.
We tend to conceive of emotion as different from reason. Furthermore, we tend to view
emotions as clouding reason. As an example, we refer here to the concept of “psychological
transference” that Irving Copi (1995) uses to explain the way in which the emotional fallacy of
offensive ad hominem functions. Copi suggests that the impact of this emotional fallacy on the
auditorium is so strong, that by mobilizing their emotions their rational capacity is clouded,
making a transfer unconsciously from the person who was disqualified, to the invalidation of that
person's argument.
Now, while that explanation of how that fallacy functions may be accurate, the issue is
that we must make a clear distinction between emotions and emotional fallacies. Not all
expressions of emotion are fallacious: conceiving emotions as fallacious per se, is not adequate.
We rather believe that between reason and emotion there should be a bridge of real and profound
contact. This view does not mean that all emotions are positive for human life, certainly there are
negative emotions. But, at the same time, reason without the involvement of emotions can be
very negative. In this context, we need to be aware that efforts need to be made to relate
emotions to logic in argumentation processes.
In this respect, we quote from argumentation theorists Moira Howes and Catherine
Hundleby’s paper “The Epistemology of Anger in Argumentation” (2018, p. 1):
While anger can derail argumentation, it can also help arguers and audiences to reason
together in argumentation. Anger can provide information about premises, biases, goals,
discussants, and depth of disagreement that people might otherwise fail to recognize or
prematurely dismiss. Anger can also enhance the salience of certain premises and
underscore the importance of related inferences. For those reasons, we claim that anger
can serve as an epistemic resource in argumentation.
This quote shows that there may be a positive relation between emotions and logic.
Moreover, it is important to extend the analysis of emotions beyond argumentation theory to
statements about world society and politics. In this sense, a quote from the Indian writer, Panjak
Mishra (2016) helps us to move in that direction.
The stunning events of our age of anger, and our perplexity before them, make it
imperative that we anchor thought in the sphere of emotions; these upheavals demand
nothing less than a radically enlarged understanding of what it means for human beings to
pursue the contradictory ideals of freedom, equality and prosperity.
In this way, we believe, Mishra relates emotions to logic and politics.
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One question that comes out at this point concerns which is first. Several studies claim
that first comes emotion and subsequently logic explains them. But there are also studies that
claim that first is logic and then emotion follows. Be that relation as may be, there is, in our
view, a strong imbrication between emotion and logic, something that is argued by several
approaches in psychology.
In some sense, we could argue that logic is analytical whereas emotion is synthetical.
That is to say, logic helps us to separate what in reality appears as united; whereas emotion is
global and therefore tends to bring together instead of dividing. Therefore, both logic and
emotions could be understood as complementary. According to Gilbert (1997):
In many arguments, and especially intimate relationship arguments, emotion can be
essential to break a deadlock by bringing attention to one dispute partner’s level of
involvement.
2.3
We continue now with visceral or physical arguments. Physical arguments would be those in
which the main thrust of the arguments is constituted by physical expressions. There could be
words and speeches, emotions, logic involved but the essence here is physical.
We need to refer to the distinction between arguments1 and arguments2. Let us say that the
physical aspect refers to both:
1) Argument1: Somebody raises a hand arguing that the other should stop.
2) Argument2: An argumentative encounter where the arguers relate to each other by
dismissive gestures with the arms and hands while not attempting to understand each
other.
3) As is the case of logical argumentation, arguments2 involve arguments1 as units of the
interactions.
It can happen, probably many times it happens, that at the same time when physical
expressions appear, there are sentences and/or words produced: “You don’t understand this”,
while making a gesture with the hand, for example.
Now, the expression of sentences or words, let say speech, is already a physical action!
Indeed, the phoniatric system is the physical apparatus that makes it possible to interact verbally
in an argument. Moreover, ultimately the brain is involved and perhaps other parts of the body.
So, the process of arguing2 is inherently physical and so is the production of arguments1. Since
the ears are involved as well, let us say that arguing is already a highly complex physical
activity.
We need to consider as well that arguments may be developed by people with no speech or
are hearing impaired. In this case the arguments would proceed in written form or some other
forms. In all these cases physical expressions of one kind or another are present.
Therefore, the very nature of argumentation involves the physical, something that we need to
take into account to start with.
However, it seems that generally what is meant by argument is not this physical base but the
intellectual activity involved: To explore this view, we use as an example the following one:
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Somebody claims that ‘Plato’s main dialogue is the Gorgias because it has gone beyond the
strictly Socratic approach of earlier dialogues and is not yet encumbered by the metaphysical
doctrine of The Republic’(argument from E.R. Dodds, Plato Gorgias, p. 25). Clearly this
argument1 is expressed physically, one way or another, and invites a response from the
interlocutor. However, the thrust of the argument goes beyond the purely physical expressions of
the utterance.
Indeed, the interlocutor may comment that the arguer has used sounds that are unpleasant,
and that does not help for facilitating a discussion, but s/he understands the academic point
involved.
The response may be for example that in her/his view The Republic is Plato’s main work.
This would constitute the beginning of an argument2 which would proceed by highly intellectual
exchanges from both arguers.
What exactly is meant by highly intellectual? Remember, the exchange is still based on
physical activity in both arguers. But it goes well beyond that. This is now an exchange that
requires careful and systematic reading of Plato’s dialogues, indeed other authors’ interpretations
of Platonic philosophy, etcetera. This is what happens especially in departments of philosophy in
universities. There is a long tradition going back to Plato’s time. Scholarship is deep and could
cover hundreds of thousands of pages in books, papers, articles, etcetera. The arguers need to be
aware of the Platonic scholarship to be able to participate successfully in the argumentation.
Therefore, we could say that the argument2 taking place, although based on a physical basis,
cannot be resolved just at this level so to speak. We agree that this argument 2 has a physical
basis: it could not take place if there are no alive bodies being involved. This is clear.
However, psychologists who specialize on empirical research on hand gestures claim that the
hands function in speaking, thinking and communicating in a way that needs to be addressed. We
quote several passages from the book Why Gesture? (2017). The first passage refers to the
Information Packaging Hypothesis (IPA):
[that Hypothesis] holds that gesture helps speakers package information into units
appropriate for verbalization. (p. 15)
When information packaging is more difficult, speakers produce more gestures. (p. 15)
We focus in this chapter on evidence that gesture plays a role in producing speech. (p. 15)
The key claim of the Information Packaging Hypothesis is that producing
representational gestures ‘helps speakers organize rich spatio-motoric information into
packages suitable for speaking. (Kita, 2000, p. 163) (p. 16)
According to Kita (2000, p.163), spatio-motoric thinking provides an ‘alternative
informational organization that is not readily accessible to analytic thinking’ (p. 163) and
in producing speech ‘the two modes of thinking are coordinated and tend to converge’ (p.
163). This view implies that producing gestures actually influences the way in which
information is packaged into units of speech. (p.16-17)
And Finally:
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In contrast, speech arises from ‘analytic thinking’, which is a mode of thinking that
organizes information in terms of logic and propositions. Gesturing facilitates
information packaging for speaking because spatio-motoric thinking can ‘find’
possibilities for organizing information that analytic thinking may not be able to ‘find’ as
easily. (p. 33)
From these quotations we may come up with some conclusions about our understanding
of the way that the physical aspects of human beings relate to intellectual work.
First, we could say that intellectual work requires the coordination with physical activity
of the body: that is, that intellectual work may not be able to be developed if there are no
gestures (with our hands) that contribute to the organization of thinking analytically.
Second, this relates to the way our brain functions in analytic thinking. Somehow, what
will come out as speech in say an argument about a philosophical issue, such as the Platonic one
referred to above, requires physical participation without which there may not be an academic
argument1 at all and so an argument2 either.
Third, we are not trying to reduce the understanding of Plato’s philosophy to purely
physical inputs. We must begin with a clear sense that the production of analytical ideas has a
reality that must be an essential datum, but those ideas require for their production the
participation of what is termed “spatio-motoric thinking.”
Now, this elaboration so far is itself a case of analytical thinking. So, how exactly has the
spatio-motoric process been involved in its production? This is a topic for further research,
moreover one that could most likely provide new views on the relation between the logical and
the physical modes of argumentation.
2.4 Finally, we examine in this section the kisceral or intuitive mode of argumentation
This mode appears certainly as the most complex. When Michael Gilbert introduces this
mode of arguing in his book as we saw above, the word kisceral is followed by the word in
brackets (intuitive). Thus, we could interpret that kisceral means the same as intuitive. We
discuss now the relation between both words.
For that purpose, it is important to quote from the section of the book in which Gilbert
discusses the kisceral mode in detail.
The term kisceral derives from the Japanese word ‘ki’ which signifies energy, life-force,
and connectedness. The kisceral is that mode of communication that relies on the
intuitive, the imaginative, the religious, the spiritual, and the mystical. It is a wide
category used frequently beyond the halls of the academe, and before the category is
disdained, it should be understood. To begin with, we refer to such phenomena as
‘hunches’, ‘feelings’, even ‘coincidences.’ (p. 86)
First, we should refer to the relation between the words kisceral and intuition. There is a
long tradition in philosophy that relates to intuition. Suffice to mention the work of Descartes,
Spinosa, Kant, Fichte, Bergson, Husserl and others in which intuition has a significant role to
play. Generally, intuition (from the Latin “intuere,” meaning “to look”) is understood in general,
as knowing the truth in an immediate way without previous logical reasoning. Now, it might
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seem strange, to say the least, if we were to associate the use that these philosophers have of this
concept with hunches, feelings and coincidences. Or perhaps, we could say that in principle we
cannot discount that association. Why should we discount it? Can we just neglect it? After all,
these philosophers must have had hunches, feelings and must have had to deal with coincidences
even in their most abstract and deep philosophical elaborations.
However, we need to go back to the beginning of this section. One question that requires
examination is the very use of the word kisceral derived from the Japanese word ki which
signifies energy, life-force and connectedness. It seems easier apparently to accept that there is a
relation between connectedness and intuition: at least in our own experience, intuition relates to
connections beyond the ordinary. We are prepared to accept that we have a sense of general
connectedness to the world, to other human beings, to happenings, etc. When people say that
they understand something intuitively we could understand that they mean it in that sense: some
kind of view that it is possible to appreciate, even as something to think about before accepting
it. It may be seen as the beginning of a process for further examination. However, it seems
somewhat more problematic to relate to energy and life-force, although these two aspects could
be left for further examination. The notion of connectedness is sufficient to take seriously this
mode of argumentation.
Adding complexity to the analysis of this mode, let us quote the following from Gilbert’s
book: “The category kisceral, carries with it no metaphysical, and certainly no spiritual,
baggage. It refers to a category of communication recognizable to most people”.
Clearly, therefore, Gilbert uses the term kisceral to refer to a series of argumentation
processes that are frequently found in life. It may be seen as too encompassing of experiences
that should not be classified together, but it does make sense. Perhaps if need be, in further
elaborations of this topic, another mode could be added as Gilbert himself says in another
context.
To conclude the section on kisceral arguments, we quote and analyze an example that
Gilbert provides in his book of such mode of argumentation.
It is difficult to create examples of kisceral arguments that are not so outré as to take
attention away from the example and the more general issue of the validity of kisceral
communications. The following is as mundane as might be found.
The Offer
Greg looked at Lisa expectantly. ‘Don’t you think we should raise the offer? He didn’t
seem too pleased with it.’ Lisa shook her head. ‘Don’t change a thing,’ she said, ‘be
patient, I just know he’ll accept it.’
The key to this example is Lisa’s feeling her unprocessed belief that the offer they made
will be accepted. (p. 87)
What Gilbert says in this quote, first of all, is that we should be concerned with the
recognition that there are kisceral arguments and that the issue of their validity is something that
requires to be dealt with after we recognize their existence. Stemming from this example, we
could say perhaps that the validity of Lisa’s claim could depend on the number of similar cases
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which turn out to be right. In any event, while in the case of logical arguments we do have a
substantial number of concepts concerning validity, in the case of the three other modes no such
concepts exist as of yet. This is an important task for supporters of Michael Gilbert’s MultiModal Argumentation approach.
3. In conclusion.
This paper does not have conclusions in the usual way as would be expected. The reasons are
several and varied. First, we have only one empirical case of an argumentation process according
to Michael Gilbert’s theory of Multi-Modal Argumentation: it was an argumentative dialogue
that we undertook between us in early 2018 in preparation for our paper for the ISSA Conference
of that year (2019). It tended to be a case of a rather deep disagreement that ended up in an
agreement that was very difficult to reach. While we still consider that experience as an
important step in our research on multi-modal argumentation, it is clearly not enough to come up
with solid conclusions. In any case, it opened a door for further research. In summary, in that
argumentative dialogue, we showed that Michael Gilbert’s theory of Multi-Modal
Argumentation made good sense.
A short summary of the main results of that argumentative dialogue would be helpful.
The topic involved in the disagreement related to the government of Chilean President Salvador
Allende who was deposed by a military coup in 1973. Both of us were supporters of Allende, but
one of us was critical of the way he handled the relation with a center party whose support may
have helped to impede the military coup. Given our initial views, we discovered that the
disagreement tended to be deep. The argumentative dialogue that was intended to overcome the
disagreement, took place during the months of January and April 2018. At the theoretical level,
we started with a comprehensive approach that involved Gilbert’s theory of Multi-Modal
Argumentation. The process was emotionally intense although we tended to keep it going within
a logical frame. There were also intense physical reactions. Finally, when it appeared that we
would not reach an agreement, something surprising and unexpected happened that provided
grounds to reach an agreement. Our immediate evaluation of that event took us to consider it as a
kisceral case.
Moreover, it has not been easy to find interlocutors to put in place another case of an
argumentative dialogue between people who have deep disagreement concerning the tragic
events in Chile in 1973.
Now, the present Conference (OSSA 12) has allowed us to deal in detail and depth with
an issue that we have been concerned with for a long time. Indeed, diversity in society, politics
and ordinary life is an important topic in our research. We are committed to work for a more
democratic society and we believe that in such society the way to deal with argumentation
requires an opening to several modes of argumentation. Indeed, argumentation is a critical
activity in democratic societies, using now the term as broadly as possible to involve not only
high level politics but also all the different levels in which human beings get socially involved
being the society as a whole or the many and varied groups that exist in it. Of course, the
academy is included. We also value that the academy in its entire breadth of activities provides
theories, views, ideas of all kinds that have great impact in the lives of all of us. If diversity has
become an extraordinary issue in contemporary societies, then argumentation also needs to be
dealt with from the point of view of diversity. And this is what we believe is our contribution
with this paper: introduce Michael Gilbert’s theory of Multi-Modal Argumentation as a way to
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deal more democratically with processes of argumentation by recognizing that the four modes of
argumentation need to be seen as hopefully working together and not based on the primacy of the
logical mode in all cases.
Finally, in the next stage of our research, we intend to reflect upon the advances of the
research on gestures by specialized psychologists, as indicated in the section on the physical
mode.
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